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Abstract: The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is estimated by integrated assessment models and is 
widely used by government agencies to value the climate impacts of rulemakings, however, the 
core discussion around SCC so far was focused on validity of obtained numerical estimates and 
related uncertainties while largely neglecting a deeper discussion of the SCC applicability limits 
stemming from the calculation method. This work provides a conceptual mathematical 
background and the economic interpretation that is behind the SCC calculation in the three 
widely used integrated assessment models. Policy makers need to be aware of a subtle, but 
decisive difference between the actual and the commonly implied meanings of SCC that 
substantially limits its applicability as compared to the current practice. 
One Sentence Summary: The Social Cost of Carbon as estimated by the three widely used 
integrated assessment models has a different meaning than commonly implied.  
Main Text:  
The concept of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) appeared in the early publications of Nordhaus 
(1) and dates back to the first works on the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model 
(2). SCC gained momentum for policy making in 2000's (3) and since then was widely used by a 
large number of organizations in policy making e.g. Worldbank (4), US EPA (5), UK (3). While 
according to Nordhaus (1) the SCC did not play a decisive role in the evaluation of the US 
climate related policies, the SCC concept is well integrated in the current policy context and 
therefore plays an important role in assessments of climate related action. The United States 
Government’s Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon is using the SCC according 
to respective regulation (5) relying for the purposes of the SCC estimation on the FUND1 (6,7) 
and PAGE2 (8-11) models along with the DICE model. 
There are a few definitions of SCC e.g. "The social cost of carbon refers to the estimate of the 
monetary value of world-wide damage done by anthropogenic CO2 emissions" (3), "‘social cost 
of carbon’ is defined as the monetary value of the damage done by emitting one more tonne of 
carbon at some point of time" (3), "it is the change in the discounted value of economic welfare 
 
1 Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) Model 
2 Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) Model 
from an additional unit of CO2-equivalent emissions" (1), or "it is the change in the discounted 
value of the utility of consumption per unit of additional emissions, denominated in terms of 
current consumption" (12), or "SCC estimates the dollar value of reduced climate change 
damages associated with a one-metric-ton reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions" (13) to 
name a few. In DICE, SCC is calculated as a ratio of the marginal value for the emissions 
equation to the marginal value for the consumption equation on optimal trajectories - those that 
deliver the maximum to the objective function, which represents societal utility. “The ratio 
calculates the economic impact of a unit of emissions in terms of t-period consumption as a 
numéraire” (12). The DICE model (1) estimates the optimal Carbon Price (CP) that is a marginal 
abatement cost - a known function depending on time and the amount of abated carbon, which is 
a decision variable. A standard DICE 2016 model3 run produces vividly different SCC and CP 
for the tail of the trajectory, see Fig. 1. The difference between SCC and CP, generally speaking, 
is not confined to the tail of the optimal trajectory, so the same model, with the exception that the 
utility function is replaced with the one that is not weighted by population (14), produces visibly 
different SCC and CP also at the head of the optimal trajectory, see Fig. 2. The CP is a direct 
result of the optimization, and SCC is a co-product obtained via marginals on that same optimal 
trajectories of the model. As both represent the price/cost of the carbon by their names and are 
expressed in the same units, the puzzle is why there is a difference between the two and what 
implications does it have for applications. 
 
Fig. 1. Social cost of carbon and the carbon price as estimated by the unmodified DICE 2016 
model. 
 
3 Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/homepage/DICE2016R-091916ap.gms (accessed on 
October 23, 2019). 
2
0
1
5
2
0
4
0
2
0
6
5
2
0
9
0
2
1
1
5
2
1
4
0
2
1
6
5
2
1
9
0
2
2
1
5
2
2
4
0
2
2
6
5
2
2
9
0
2
3
1
5
2
3
4
0
2
3
6
5
2
3
9
0
2
4
1
5
2
4
4
0
2
4
6
5
2
4
9
0
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Carbon Price (per t CO2)
Social cost of carbon
 
Fig. 2. Social cost of carbon and the carbon price as estimated by a modified version of the DICE 
2016 model where only the utility function is replaced with utility that is not weighted by 
population size. 
Unfortunately, the literature does not say anything clear on that and therefore cannot help, e.g.: 
"With an optimized climate policy (abstracting away from complications due to tax or regulatory 
distortions or inconsistent treatment in different sectors), the SCC will equal the carbon price; 
this in turn is equal to the marginal cost of emissions reduction" (12), or, (in a cost–benefit 
analysis (CBA) model) "the marginal social cost of carbon is the marginal damage done at the 
optimal level of abatement" (3), etc. Despite the lack of clarity, policy makers are keen on 
employing SCC for various reasons. 
 
Definition and Calculation 
To some degree the optimal carbon price is shadowed by the SCC - a combination of the 
two indirect products of the model – the marginal of the emissions equation and the marginal 
consumption. As these two are just the Lagrangian multipliers (15) in a constrained utility 
maximization problem, their meaning is respectively: (a) by how much the optimal utility would 
change if one ton of CO2 would be added to an emission balance equation and a new problem 
would be solved, and (b) by how much the utility would change if one dollar would be added to 
the consumption equation and a new problem would be solved. These values are expressed 
respectively in (a) units of utility per one ton of CO2 and (b) units of utility per one dollar of 
additional consumption. Both values being Lagrangian multipliers assume that the corresponding 
balance equation is perturbed (modified) by a "sufficiently small" quantity (we assume for 
simplification that one ton of CO2 and one dollar in our example satisfy that requirement). 
The equation 
  E.m + x * C.m = 0  (1) 
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 as implemented in DICE 2016 and 2013 (where E.m and C.m are marginal values for emission 
and consumption equations respectively) describes that the effects of adding one ton of CO2 to 
the emissions equation and simultaneous adding of x dollars lead to a new optimization problem 
that has the same optimal value of social utility (objective function) as the original problem, i.e. 
one ton of CO2 is being compensated by x dollars in consumption. This allows one to call x and 
"exchange rate" from one ton of CO2 of emissions added to the equation and dollars that have to 
be added to the consumption to keep the "status quo" in terms of utility assuming the optimal 
solution in a new problem. This new problem is obtained from the original problem by 
perturbing its emissions and consumption equations and is further referred to as "perturbed 
problem". The "exchange rate" can be seen as a price compensating extra one ton of emissions to 
keep the societal "status quo", which justifies the name SCC. 
A fully compatible alternative way of looking at SCC should be noted for further explanation. If 
x dollars are not added while one ton of CO2 is added to the emissions equation, the situation (in 
the sense of the optimal value of the utility function) is equal to the case when the emission 
equation is kept untouched, but x dollars are subtracted from the consumption equation. Both 
these perturbed problems would have, generally speaking, different optimal trajectories, yet the 
same optimal value of the objective function. 
 
Interpretation 
Here we provide an interpretation of a perturbed problem - the one with a perturbed equation(s). 
We start with a question what is the meaning of the correction of the emissions equation by that 
one tCO2 in a particular year? The industry may decide for whatever reason to emit just a bit 
more than planned (whether the plan is optimal or not), however, that would imply that the 
abated quantity4 and/or the capital investment5 (both are the only decision variables in DICE) 
should change so that the total production and associated emissions go up. So, in case of a 
change in industrial emissions, the correction of the emission balance equation is not justified. 
Such correction of the equation is justified if the uncontrolled emissions (in DICE 2016 
commonly referred to as land emissions) need to be corrected. 
For the ease of storytelling, we will consider adding emissions and refer to the equivalent 
monetary damage (decreased consumption) that it creates. A similar consideration of reducing 
emissions and its equivalent in terms of increased consumption is also valid. 
According to a note made earlier in the text, subtracting x dollars from the consumption equation 
(while keeping emission balance equation intact) would achieve exactly that same effect on the 
optimal value of utility as adding one ton to emission balance equation (while keeping the 
consumption intact). This newly subtracted consumption x has to have the same "external" nature 
i.e. being something that is not controlled by the model similar to the discussed case of the nature 
of the emissions perturbation. Such an external source for consumption decrease could be a 
disaster that is not taken into account in the damage function of the model6. However, that is a 
 
4 The related decision variable is denoted as the emission control rate, MIU(t) in the DICE 2016 GAMS source code. 
5 The related decision variable is denoted as the gross savings rate as fraction of gross world product, S(t) in the 
DICE 2016 GAMS source code. 
6 For a symmetric consideration (emission reduction) positive non-zero x is harder to justify within the existing 
model, this would be an increase in consumption that is not supported by production as conceptualized in the model.  
rather virtual disaster, as it implies a pulse that only affects consumption, but does not affect the 
capital. 
As we have noted earlier, this interpretation of SCC is fully compatible with the interpretation 
comparing an unperturbed problem with a perturbed one where a perturbation in emissions (plus 
or minus one ton CO2) is compensated by the perturbation in consumption (minus or plus x 
dollars respectively), so that the optimal social utility remains the same. 
 
Discussion and Implications for Policy Context 
The SCC equates emissions' and consumption perturbations in a perturbed problem in such a 
way that the maximum societal utility on an optimal trajectory of the new perturbed problem 
remains the same as in the unperturbed problem. This, however, has nothing to do with any 
deviation of actual emissions under control from the estimated optimal plan. For example, both 
over-emitting and under-emitting as compared to the optimum would lead to losses in utility and 
by that create a social cost in a wider sense. From this perspective, the SCC as calculated in 
(Eq. 1), seems to be an irrelevant concept to justify or enforce keeping emissions on an optimal 
trajectory in whatever form including its application as a carbon tax. 
SCC only comes handy in case if, because of the reasons beyond the controls embedded into the 
model i.e. unforeseen event, the emission equation gets disturbed. In this case it only can 
estimate the monetary damage of such an event in the sense that if there were an "external" 
source for increasing consumption by that amount, that event would not have had any impact on 
the utility. In no case SCC can provide a guidance on how to re-distribute consumption and 
investment after such event has been discovered - to answer these questions one has to carry out 
an optimization of the new (perturbed) problem. 
It is needless to say that SCC and carbon price are not comparable despite they are expressed in 
the same units. As the DICE model is run and an optimal solution is found, the CP is the only 
optimal carbon price in the societal context as reflected by the models utility function. This 
social optimality is unconditional on the value of SCC. 
The findings obtained from the analysis of the SCC calculation in the DICE model are relevant 
beyond the scope of DICE itself. The discovered semantic issue is in the attempt to apply the 
SCC value (obtained via perturbed problem employing non-human made emissions that are 
different from those in the original problem) to shape human-made emissions through policies 
like a carbon tax. The FUND (6,7) and PAGE (8-11) models that also estimate SCC, while being 
structurally different from DICE (12), both employ the same idea of an "emission pulse" that 
increases total emissions by a pre-defined amount over certain period of time to generate a new 
"marginal" model (that is otherwise equal to the original), which then provides a trajectory to 
derive the SCC value. This newly added emissions are not caused by any change in the 
abatement and are the basis for the SCC estimation. The DICE model vividly demonstrates 
inconsistencies resulting from the application of such constructed SCC to enforce desired 
abatement. 
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